




Battling the Public Health Harms of Tobacco Takes Time, Persistence, and 
Political Will: Reflecting on the New York State Clean Indoor Air Act of 
2003 
Mary E. Helander 
 
This month marks the 18th anniversary of the enactment of the 
New York State Clean Indoor Air Act1 (CAA03), one of the 
state's earliest legislative responses to the negative health impacts 
of second-hand smoke. This law, which restricts indoor smoking 
in restaurants, taverns, and workplaces, took more than three 
legislative sessions and five years to enact.  
 
The history of this policy demonstrates significant roles of official 
and unofficial actors in the nuts, bolts, and machinery of an iconic 
public health policy. CAA03, other state-level tobacco control 
legislation and laws that regulate sales and marketing or impose 
excise taxes on tobacco products, and the U.S. Surgeon General’s 
1964 public health warning about the harms of tobacco,2 are 
credited with curtailing cardiovascular disease, various cancers, 
cerebrovascular accident (CVA, or stroke), diabetes, and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), including emphysema 
and chronic bronchitis.3,4  
 
Despite state efforts like CAA03, smoking remains the top 
preventable cause of disease and premature death in the U.S. 
Almost sixty years after the 1964 Surgeon General’s report, it is 
time for a more serious nationally organized policy response to 
tobacco and its harms. 
 
The U.S. Falls Short on National Tobacco Policy  
In the early 2000s, countries around the globe began adopting 
national bans that restricted indoor smoking to protect the rights 
and health of non-smokers and minors. By 2009, all European 
Union (EU) countries had national tobacco regulations centered 
on public smoking bans and protections from second-hand smoke.5,6 Health improvements attributed to smoking laws 
in the EU include a reduction in acute myocardial infarction (AMI, or heart attack) and improved lung and respiratory 
health.6 In 2004, a study reported that New York State experienced a 12% drop in AMI mortality in the year 
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KEY TAKEAWAYS 
• The U.S. Surgeon General's 1964 
Advisory Committee on Smoking and 
Health Report, warning about the 
dangerous health effects of tobacco, was a 
watershed moment in public health 
history. 
• Significant health policy takes time, 
political will, and multiple players. New 
York State’s Clean Indoor Air Act of 
2003 (CAA03) involved the NYS 
Department of Health, committed and 
bipartisan state lawmakers, and health 
professional organizations such as 
NYSPHA. 
• CAA03 set the stage for a steady stream 
of state smoking legislation over two 
decades, which are collectively 
recognized for significant population 
health benefits. 
• Almost sixty years after the 1964 
Surgeon General’s report, the U.S. needs a 
nationally organized policy response to 
address the prevalent but preventable 





immediately following the enactment of CAA03.7 
 
In contrast, the U.S. remains the world’s only high-income country without a national policy designed to unequivocally 
protect the health of smokers and non-smokers from the harms of tobacco. While U.S. states have developed public 
health responses to tobacco use, starting with California in 1995, followed by New York eight years later,8,9 there has 
been virtually no federally organized response beyond eliminating smoking in federal buildings and on domestic flights. 
A notable piece of federal legislation was enacted in 2009, during the Obama administration, that placed tobacco 
industry regulation under the FDA.10,11 However, this public protection was somewhat tepid. It gave the FDA a 
reactive oversight capability related to litigation, while leaving the most important tobacco-harm-prevention policy-
making decisions to the states.8,9,10,11  
 
Given that smoking is the leading cause of preventable death in the U.S. and worldwide, one might wonder why 
smoking bans have evolved in such a haphazard manner in the U.S. Was it intentional decentralization in an effort to 
protect states’ rights? Or was it the result of national lobbying by the tobacco industry? The available evidence suggests 
the latter, with the tobacco industry and its lobbyists often embracing the narrative of states’ rights to hamstring any 
national legislation that might reduce tobacco consumption and, therefore, tobacco industry profits. 9,12,13 
 
Key Players: The Tobacco Industry, the Surgeon General, and Health Advocacy 
Groups 
In his book describing the history of the tobacco industry and the adverse effects of smoking, Robert Proctor12 
characterized cigarettes as “the deadliest artifact in the history of human civilization” and called for a complete ban on 
their manufacture and sale. His arguments are built on a history of deception and fraud by the tobacco industry over the 
past century, including:  
 
1. The secret work of tobacco chemists scheming to make tobacco products more addictive.  
2. The role of tobacco manufacturers in blocking public information about smoking-related health hazards and 
creating misinformation about “health benefits.”13   
3. Covert strategies to maximize revenue, profits, and stock values while contributing to the deadliest yet most 
preventable cause of premature death in the U.S. and the world. 12 
 
Proctor credited health researchers and public health professionals of the 1950s and early 1960s for the crusade that 
scientifically linked tobacco smoke to cardiovascular and lung diseases, various cancers, stroke, diabetes, COPD, and 
premature death.3,4  
 
The U.S. Surgeon General’s 1964 report caused a momentous shift in attitudes about smoking with its official 
acknowledgement that smoking is harmful to human health.2 Prior to this government admission, corporate interests—
the tobacco industry and its profits—took precedence and worked directly against public health by promoting tobacco 
products as safe.12,13 After 1964, the combination of scientific research, lawsuits, public health campaigns, and 
information all contributed to gradual changes in public opinion and a mounting trend toward embracing a healthy 
lifestyle.  
 
The U.S. Surgeon General’s 1964 declaration was a watershed moment in public health history, eventually leading to 
state smoking bans such as CAA03. In opposition to the tobacco industry and its lobby, professional organizations—
including the NYS Public Health Association (NYSPHA), the American Lung Association (ALA), the American Cancer 
Society (ACS), the American Heart Association (AHA), and the American Medical Association (AMA)—served as 
interest groups advocating for New York State residents’ health. Tobacco control has been a centerpiece of NYSPHA’s 
Policy and Advocacy Committee work for decades. The ALA, ACS, AHA, and AMA have played a crucial role in 





The Smoking Ban’s Early Years: NYS Department of Health and Key Businesses 
Following the Surgeon General’s 1964 proclamation, the New York State Department of Health stepped up efforts to 
educate residents about tobacco harm and to monitor incidences of smoking and related morbidity and mortality. 
Tobacco excise taxes and smoking bans followed. 
 
Virtually every state had instituted tobacco excise taxes by the early 1970s. However, it took until the mid-1990s for an 
organized NYS DOH strategy to emerge regarding public smoking bans. The New York State Tobacco Control Program 
(NYS TCP) was officially established in 2000, two full years after CAA03 was first introduced in the New York State 
Legislature. In the early years of the smoking ban bill, restaurants and bars adamantly opposed it, fearing negative 
economic impacts. However, as time went on, through networking, public hearings, meetings, and various negotiations, 
opposition faded, and the New York State Restaurant Association (NYSRA) was convinced to throw its support behind 
the bill. This group’s support was considered a significant factor toward passage in the state legislature.14,15 Various 
studies have since shown that the economic impact of smoking bans on restaurants and taverns is neutral or positive.16 
 
The Seeming Futility of Persistent State Lawmakers 
The series of bills that eventually became CAA03 took several years, from introduction in the New York State 
Legislature (Assembly) to passage and signing into law in March 2003 (see Figure 1). The bills were referred dozens of 
times to committees for discussion, negotiation, and revision over at least three legislative terms.17 
 
CAA03’s passage was not easy. In addition to its Democratic Assembly sponsor, the bill had 48 co-sponsors by its final 
term—a group that crossed party lines, with forty-five Democrats and three Republicans. The Assembly sponsor of 
CAA03 was Alexander Grannis, an environmentalist and career politician in New York State. In addition to recruiting a 
large co-sponsorship group in the Assembly, Grannis worked with NYS Senate sponsor (Republican) Charles J. 
Fuschillo, Jr. and Senate members to convince them of the merits of the bill and to champion the bill through three 
different committees: Health, Rules, and Codes. 
 
CAA03 passed with 97 yea votes (to 44 nay) in the New York State Assembly on March 26, 2003.1 This passage was 
not a landslide, reflecting the fact that public smoking bans were not popular with the public in the early 2000s.  
 
CAA03, while unpopular at first, now has widespread acceptance and was followed by several similar public bans, 
including restrictions extended to railroad stations and platforms (2011), school and library doorways (2012, 2018), 
hospitals and residential health facilities (2013), playgrounds (2013), and childcare facilities (2018) as well as 
provisions for vaping/e-cigarettes (2017, 2019). The steps leading to the enactment of CAA03 exemplifies the virtues 
of the deliberation process and the rationale for achieving stability when valuable time is taken for discussions, 
negotiations, compromise, debate, and persuasion.  
 
Despite the persistence of New York and other state lawmakers in addressing tobacco harms, second-hand smoke is still 
linked to roughly 109 U.S. deaths per day (one-twelfth of the daily total of premature deaths caused by tobacco).3,4 







Figure 1: A Detailed Timeline of the New York State Legislative Process Leading to Enacting the New 
York State Clean Indoor Air Act of 2003.  
Source: Figure created by the author using information obtained from https://nyassembly.gov. 
 
Lessons from the New York State Clean Indoor Air Act of 2003 
The Clean Indoor Air Act of 2003 epitomizes the intertwining of policy and politics, public health and economics, true 
grit and strategy, and the common good versus corporate and individual business interests. It demonstrates how parties 
with seemingly polarized positions can reach an important agreement for the good of public health despite years of 
public misinformation—in this case, from the tobacco industry and business owners worried about the loss of smoking 
patrons in restaurants and taverns. 
 
The U.S. Surgeon General, the NYS DOH, and key state legislators (particularly sponsors Assemblyman Grannis and 
Senator Fuschillo, Jr.) played crucial official roles with impacts not to be seen for decades. Health advocacy groups, such 
as NYSPHA, ALU, ACS, and AHA, helped to ensure an active research community. In unofficial roles, the professional 
trade organization NYSRA was necessary for CAA03's passage— passage that likely would not have happened without 
the advocacy of health interest groups. 
 
In summary, CAA03 set the stage for a steady stream of smoking-related bills over the next seventeen years, 
which are collectively recognized for saving and improving the quality of many lives.18 Behind these health 
improvements were many key players, spanning several decades, whose collective contributions have impacted and 
continue to shape public health at the state levels. It is time now for more serious consideration, and for finding the 
political will, to address the persistent public health problem of tobacco at the U.S. national level. 
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